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EXECUTIVE POWER, DRONE EXECUTIONS, 
AND THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
OF AMERICAN CITIZENS 
Jonathan G. D’Errico* 
 
Few conflicts have tested the mettle of procedural due process more than 
the War on Terror.  Although fiery military responses have insulated the 
United States from another 9/11, the Obama administration’s 2011 drone 
execution of a U.S. citizen allegedly associated with al-Qaeda without formal 
charges or prosecution sparked public outrage.  Judicial recognition that 
this nonbattlefield execution presented a plausible procedural due process 
claim ignited questions which continue to smolder today:  What are the limits 
of executive war power?  What constitutional privileges do American citizens 
truly retain in the War on Terror?  What if the executive erred in its judgment 
and mistakenly executed an innocent citizen? 
Currently, no legal regime provides answers or guards against the 
infringement of procedural due process the next time the executive 
determines that an American citizen must be executed to protect the borders 
of the United States.  The executive remains free to unilaterally target and 
execute an American citizen via drone strike without the formal process that 
typically accompanies a death sentence under U.S. law.  Protected under the 
aegis of national security, executive discretion has trumped the procedural 
due process rights of American citizens. 
To contextualize these issues of presidential power and procedural due 
process, this Note first surveys the modern War on Terror by examining the 
statutory authority enabling drone strikes and the scope of executive war-
making powers.  Next, this Note employs the balancing test devised by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to assess the due process 
afforded a citizen targeted for extrajudicial drone execution under the 
executive’s unilateral methodology.  Two potential safeguards—ex post and 
ex ante judicial review of drone strikes—are examined as possible defenses 
against the unjustified execution of an American citizen. 
After comparing these two systems of judicial review, this Note details and 
advocates for the congressional implementation of a narrowly tailored ex 
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ante schema to provide an additional layer of process and reduce the risk of 
an unfounded drone execution.  By lowering the likelihood of an erroneous 
execution, this precise ex ante legal regime strives to fulfill the procedural 
due process requirements delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge.  This finely 
tailored ex ante regime mitigates executive discretion while still bending to 
meet the onerous demands of national security imposed in the modern age of 
terror. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2011, the Obama administration employed a targeted drone 
strike to covertly execute Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen.1  Anwar al-Aulaqi was 
born in the United States, rose to notoriety as a fiery preacher of violent jihad, 
and purportedly joined the ranks of al-Qaeda.2  Aulaqi’s prolific YouTube 
sermons endorsing acts of terror connected him with numerous jihadists.3 
Despite a large body of public evidence connecting Aulaqi to violent 
extremist positions and acts of terrorism,4 he was executed as a suspected 
terrorist outside an active combat zone without ever being formally charged, 
convicted, or detained in connection with plotting or assisting a terrorist 
attack.5  At the time of Aulaqi’s execution, Yemen was not a formal 
battleground for U.S. armed forces.6  The U.S. government refused to 
produce specific evidence linking Aulaqi to al-Qaeda to prevent the 
dissemination of alleged “state secrets” that could jeopardize national 
security.7  Aulaqi’s death at the hands of the Obama administration marks 
the first time since the Civil War that the U.S. government publicly 
acknowledged the execution of an American citizen as an enemy combatant 
without a trial.8 
Although conspicuously absent from Aulaqi’s case, formal prosecutions, 
trials, and convictions are all examples of the procedural due process 
guaranteed to U.S. citizens by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.9  
This constitutional safeguard is infringed when the federal government 
intentionally deprives a citizen of life, liberty, or property without the 
 
 1. Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in 
America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/ 
world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html 
[https://perma.cc/9R95-ZXFA]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html 
[https://perma.cc/AAJ6-R4AR]. 
 4. In a February 2010 interview, Aulaqi called for jihad against America, praised the 
actions of the Christmas Day bomber and the Fort Hood shooter, and implored others to follow 
in their footsteps. See Interview:  Anwar al-Awlaki, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2010), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/02/2010271074776870.html [https://perma.cc/893Y-
WZ3K].  Aulaqi founded the al-Qaeda publication Inspire and frequently contributed articles 
advocating for assassinations, bombings, and other attacks against Western targets. Ian Black, 
Inspire Magazine:  The Self-Help Manual for al-Qaida Terrorists, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/may/24/inspire-magazine-self-help-
manual-al-qaida-terrorists [https://perma.cc/7W9R-HBRJ]; see also Shane, supra note 3 
(referencing Aulaqi’s “digital legacy” of YouTube sermons advocating for war against the 
West). 
 5. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (Aulaqi I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 6. See Shane, supra note 3. 
 7. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 64, 80–81 (D.D.C. 2014); Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 40, 45, Aulaqi I, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-cv-01469), 
2010 WL 4974323, at *14. 
 8. Mazzetti, Savage & Shane, supra note 1. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no American shall “be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”). 
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sufficient procedural protection demanded by the particular situation.10  The 
complete absence of formal process afforded Aulaqi prior to his execution 
was recognized in a 2014 decision from the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which found that Aulaqi’s death presented a “plausible” 
procedural due process claim.11 
In July 2010, before any litigation concerning Aulaqi arose and over a year 
prior to his execution, the Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded in a 
classified internal memo that the executive could unilaterally execute Aulaqi 
without infringing upon his Fifth Amendment due process rights.12  In 
coming to this conclusion, the DOJ referenced a test devised by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge13 to assess the appropriate measure 
of due process mandated by the Fifth Amendment.14  This fact-specific 
balancing test weighs:  (1) the citizen’s interest in life, liberty, or property 
affected by the official action; (2) the government’s interest in carrying out 
the official action; (3) the possibility that the official action erroneously 
deprived the citizen’s life, liberty, or property; and (4) the potential benefit 
of implementing additional safeguards.15  This framework evaluates 
government procedures to ensure adequate process accompanies official 
actions that affect a private citizen’s life, liberty, or property.16  While this 
memorandum (the “DOJ White Memo”) briefly acknowledged the risk of an 
unfounded drone strike, it never considered Aulaqi’s life interest nor 
 
 10. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (holding that an 
individual’s entitlement to due process protection must be closely and concretely tied to a life, 
liberty, or property interest); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (asserting that the 
Due Process Clause does not protect against an injury caused by negligent conduct); 
O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980) (recognizing that due 
process protection does not extend to “indirect adverse effects of governmental action”); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”). 
 11. Aulaqi II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 73–74 (holding that the complaint stated a plausible 
procedural due process claim given Aulaqi “was executed without charge, indictment, or 
prosecution”).  See infra notes 112–25 for a discussion of the litigation surrounding Aulaqi’s 
execution. 
 12. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 38 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ 
White Memo], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014-06-23_barron-
memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF84-QZD6] (“[W]e do not believe that al-Aulaqi’s U.S. 
citizenship imposes constitutional limitations that would preclude the contemplated lethal 
action . . . .”).  This Note will not attempt to reconcile whether it was appropriate to target 
Aulaqi as an “enemy belligerent” due to the significant amount of classified information 
redacted from the DOJ White Memo. Id. at 21–23.  The DOJ White Memo also contains an 
explanation of why Aulaqi’s execution did not violate federal statutory law or the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 1–37, 41.  An analysis of the DOJ’s reasoning concerning these issues is 
beyond the purview of this Note. 
 13. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 14. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39. 
 15. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.  See infra Part II for the application of this test.  
Although “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and “the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards” can be treated as a single prong of the Mathews test, this 
Note will discuss each concept individually to fully flesh out the relevant analysis. See infra 
Parts II.C–D. 
 16. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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evaluated nonlethal methods of providing additional process beyond a 
“capture operation.”17 
The tension between the DOJ White Memo’s greenlight to execute Aulaqi 
absent formal process and subsequent judicial recognition of a plausible due 
process claim demand further exploration.  This Note examines the outer 
limits of unilateral executive military power18 and explicitly balances all 
factors of the Mathews test19 to analyze whether additional safeguards should 
be implemented to protect against an unjustified execution and the 
infringement of procedural due process.20  Specifically, this Note assesses 
judicial review as an additional measure to safeguard against the risk of the 
mistaken deprivation of life21 and advocates for implementing a narrow ex 
ante methodology to review proposed drone strikes targeting American 
citizens.22  This precisely tailored ex ante regime provides greater due 
process and diffuses federal power without unduly burdening necessary 
executive decision-making in the War on Terror.23 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of drone strikes in the War on 
Terror, the due process rights of U.S. citizens, and how the government’s 
methodology for the drone execution of a U.S. citizen reconciles such rights.  
Part I also examines the scope of the executive’s war-making authority. 
Part II evaluates the procedural due process concerns underlying the 
executive’s current methodology for targeting an American citizen for drone 
execution.  Part II.A examines the magnitude of a citizen’s life interest at 
stake in a drone execution, and Part II.B discusses the government’s interest 
in national security.  Part II.C evaluates the risk of an unjustified execution 
of an American citizen under the executive’s current methodology.  Part II.D 
appraises the potential benefits of implementing judicial review of drone 
strikes to safeguard against an unjustified execution of an American citizen 
and the infringement of procedural due process rights. 
Part III advocates for the narrow implementation of ex ante judicial 
review.  Part III.A details the pragmatic benefits of ex ante review that would 
not be present in an ex post regime.  Finally, Part III.B enumerates an ex ante 
methodology that provides additional process without unduly burdening the 
executive. 
I.  A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ignited the War on Terror.  
Unconventional enemies, shocking tragedies, and urban guerilla warfare 
 
 17. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 40. 
 18. See infra Part I.E. 
 19. 424 U.S. at 335. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part II.D. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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soon defined this conflict.24  Ever-changing threats have expanded this 
conflict throughout the Middle East and over several presidential 
administrations.25  Part I.A surveys the role of drone strikes in the War on 
Terror.  Part I.B examines the statutory authority enabling the executive’s 
drone strikes.  Part I.C details the extent of due process rights that protect 
Americans even when targeted abroad under the aforementioned statutory 
authority.  Part I.D inspects the executive’s methodology for assessing 
whether an American citizen should be targeted for drone execution.  Finally, 
Part I.E analyzes the breadth of the executive’s unilateral military authority 
and how the political question doctrine defines the scope of this authority. 
A.  Mapping the Landscape of Drone Strikes 
Upon taking the oath of office in 2009, President Obama inherited two 
covert counterterrorism strategies developed during the Bush administration:  
the black-site interrogation program and unmanned predator-drone 
assassinations.26  Within forty-eight hours of assuming office, President 
Obama signed an executive order prohibiting torture in accordance with 
international conventions and federal law, thereby officially eliminating the 
black-site interrogation program.27  Within seventy-two hours of assuming 
office, President Obama ordered drone strikes in Pakistan that killed an 
estimated eleven people, including up to five children.28  Not to be outdone 
by his predecessor, President Trump has reportedly eliminated bureaucratic 
drone regulations and expanded the scope of such attacks.29  Torture was 
formally removed from the War on Terror, but drone strikes are emphatically 
here to stay.30 
 
 24. See Stephanie Gaskell, How the War on Terror Changed the Way America Fights, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/how-the-
war-on-terror-changed-the-way-america-fights/279250/ [https://perma.cc/YQH8-X43E]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Micah Zenko, Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES:  ROOM FOR DEBATE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/ 
01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-
legacy [https://perma.cc/YM6W-28D8]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Daniel J. Rosenthal & Loren Dejonge Schulman, Trump’s Secret War on Terror, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/ 
trump-war-terror-drones/567218/ [https://perma.cc/88TZ-HG47]. 
 30. Notwithstanding President Obama’s 2009 prohibition of torture, a laundry list of 
human rights abuses stemming from unbridled executive discretion permeate the War on 
Terror. See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (alleging abusive 
interrogations during military detention); Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(alleging widespread warrantless eavesdropping on American citizens); El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–02 (4th Cir. 2007) (alleging illegal detainment under the CIA 
“extraordinary rendition program” and torture).  See generally Memorandum from John C. 
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/ 
yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/E796-VNJ7] (notoriously defending the 
legality of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” informally known as the “Torture Memos”).  
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Unmanned drone strikes provide the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
with a discrete weapon to attack targets which does not risk the lives of 
American service members.31  Predator drones’ hellfire missiles target those 
believed to be high-ranking members of terrorist organizations.32  In recent 
years, the list of targeted groups has grown to encompass the Islamic State 
and affiliated groups.33  Initially focused on targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Obama administration expanded the breadth of drone strikes to a variety 
of noncombat theaters, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.34  The Obama 
administration not only expanded the breadth of drone strikes but also 
increased the volume of targeted attacks.35  While President Bush authorized 
roughly fifty drone strikes over the course of his presidency, President 
Obama sanctioned over five hundred strikes.36  This ten-fold increase has 
generated controversy as experts claim that 12 percent of the nearly four 
thousand deaths from the Obama administration’s drone strikes were 
civilians.37  While American citizens are included in the approximately 480 
civilians mistakenly executed under the Obama administration, Anwar al-
Aulaqi remains the only American citizen who the president publicly 
acknowledged was intentionally targeted and executed.38  Despite the Obama 
administration’s drone legacy, President Trump has reportedly indicated that 
he wants the CIA to “take a more aggressive posture” with regard to drone 
strikes.39 
B.  Killing as a Matter of Law:  The Statutory Authority 
for Drone Executions 
The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations relied on the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF or “the Act”) as statutory authority to 
 
This is not a modern legacy isolated to the War on Terror. See Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 31. Scott Shane, Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth:  U.S. Is Often Unsure About 
Who Will Die, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/ 
drone-strikes-reveal-uncomfortable-truth-us-is-often-unsure-about-who-will-die.html 
[https://perma.cc/2KFM-S227]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Mary Louise Kelly, When the U.S. Military Strikes, White House Points to a 2001 
Measure, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/06/ 
492857888/when-the-u-s-military-strikes-white-house-points-to-a-2001-measure 
[https://perma.cc/WSN9-RKTU]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Zenko, supra note 26. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jeffrey S. Brand & Amos N. Guiora, Judicial Review of Planned Drone Attacks Would 
Save Lives, N.Y. TIMES:  ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes/judicial-review-of-
planned-drone-attacks-would-save-lives [https://perma.cc/ZS9R-V5AT]. 
 38. Shane, supra note 31. 
 39. Ken Dilanian & Courtney Kube, Trump Administration Wants to Increase CIA Drone 
Strikes, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/trump-admin-
wants-increase-cia-drone-strikes-n802311 [https://perma.cc/2XUR-58WK]. 
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conduct targeted drone executions.40  Congress expediently passed the 
AUMF three days after the 9/11 attacks, which succinctly grants the president 
broad authority to use any “necessary and appropriate force” against those 
determined to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 
attacks.41  The Obama administration asserted that the AUMF also provides 
authority to target ancillary groups, such as ISIS (also known as ISIL), that 
are more tenuously related to the 9/11 attacks than al-Qaeda or the Taliban.42  
The Trump administration’s drone policy echoes a similar—if not broader—
understanding of the AUMF’s reach.43  The authority granted by the AUMF 
has no expiration date and no geographic limits—no corner of the earth is 
outside the Act’s broad grant of executive killing power.44  The AUMF could 
theoretically be used for drone strikes in London, Paris, or Madrid.45 
The scope of the AUMF’s vague language has been consistently 
challenged and refined, especially with regard to precisely who is considered 
affiliated with the 9/11 attacks, the breadth of activity covered under the Act, 
and the outer limits of the executive’s authority under the Act.46  Courts have 
noted that determining who is covered under the AUMF, and the extent of 
such coverage, is a highly challenging and nuanced fact-driven inquiry.47  
The executive’s modern-day use of the AUMF to target ISIS, a group that 
has actively fought al-Qaeda and did not exist when the AUMF was enacted, 
is a bold display of presidential discretion that further muddied the murky 
 
 40. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)); Gene Healy & John Glaser, Opinion, Repeal, Don’t 
Replace, Trump’s War Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/17/opinion/repeal-replace-trump-war-powers.html [https://perma.cc/N325-7B3H]. 
 41. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224; Healy & Glaser, supra 
note 40. 
 42. Kelly, supra note 33. 
 43. See Julian Borger, U.S. Air Wars Under Trump:  Increasingly Indiscriminate, 
Increasingly Opaque, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/jan/23/us-air-wars-trump [https://perma.cc/T9GE-C3VA]. 
 44. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. at 224–25; Kelly, supra note 33; 
see Borger, supra note 43. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 46. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594 (2006) (holding that the AUMF does not 
expressly authorize the president to convene a military commission to try prisoners otherwise 
detained under the AUMF); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521–22 (2004) (holding that 
the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” language authorizes detention of enemy 
combatants but does not authorize indefinite detention nor supersede a minimal due process 
requirement); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Detaining an 
individual who ‘substantially supports’ [a violent extremist organization], but is not part of it, 
is simply not authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war.”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 
F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the AUMF not only encompasses the 
organizations responsible for the 9/11 attacks but also the nations that sponsored those acts of 
terrorism); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005) (recognizing that new members 
who join al-Qaeda after September 11, 2001, are still covered by the AUMF because of their 
affiliation with an “organization” that falls under the AUMF). 
 47. See, e.g., Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (“The key inquiry, then, is not necessarily 
whether one self-identifies as a member of the organization (although this could be relevant 
in some cases), but whether the individual functions or participates within or under the 
command structure of the organization . . . .”). 
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boundaries of the AUMF’s authority.48  This expansive reading of the AUMF 
invites future exercises of increased executive discretion.49  Many of the 
AUMF’s puzzling applications and legal challenges derive from the its 
exceptional brevity—the original public law was under 400 words.50 
In addition to a slew of legal disputes challenging its authority, the AUMF 
has consistently faced congressional resistance.51  On June 29, 2017, the 
House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment that would have 
effectively repealed the AUMF.52  Citing concerns that the AUMF grants the 
president “authority to wage war in perpetuity,” the amendment was intended 
to induce Congress to pass new legislation that would appropriately 
modernize defense appropriations for the fight against ISIS.53  Although the 
Senate ultimately rejected this proposal, this amendment was only the most 
recent attack in a long history of congressional rebuffs to the AUMF’s 
sprawling power.54  Despite congressional resistance, the AUMF remains a 
valid authority for the executive to conduct drone strikes against al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, and the Islamic State across the globe. 
C.  The Global Procedural Due Process Rights of U.S. Citizens 
Although the AUMF remains intact and continues to provide for assertive 
displays of executive power throughout the world, it does not grant boundless 
dominion.  Even in the context of national security, some measure of 
constitutional shielding always tempers the government’s ability to target a 
U.S. citizen under the AUMF.55  However, the entirety of constitutional 
protection does not extend globally—U.S. citizens only retain the 
Constitution’s “fundamental guarantees” when abroad.56 
 
 48. Kelly, supra note 33. 
 49. See id.; see also Daniel Brown, Trump Will Keep the U.S. Military in Syria Without 
New Congressional Authorization—and It Could Set a Dangerous Precedent, BUS. INSIDER 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-aumf-us-military-syria-without-
new-authorization-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/3T5Q-SQ88]. 
 50. See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)). 
 51. Jeremy Herb & Deirdre Walsh, House Panel Votes to Repeal War Authorization for 
Fight Against ISIS and Al Qaeda, CNN (June 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/ 
politics/house-panel-repeal-war-authorization-isis-al-qaeda/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8C2K-36H3]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting the concerns of Democratic Representative Barbara Lee of California). 
 54. Joshua Keating, Barbara Lee’s Long War on the War on Terror, SLATE (Aug. 7, 
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/08/is_barbara_lee_ 
finally_winning_her_fight_to_repeal_the_aumf.html [https://perma.cc/7WL2-EJV6]. 
 55. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (“The United States is entirely a creature of 
the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other source.  It can only act in accordance 
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”). 
 56. Id. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the 
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life 
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see 
also id. at 8–9 (noting that “fundamental” constitutional rights travel with U.S. citizens but 
declining to explicitly list which rights travel and under what circumstances). 
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The Supreme Court has recognized the right to procedural due process as 
indivisibly tied to American citizenship on a global scale.57  In Reid v. 
Covert,58 the Court found that a U.S. citizen was constitutionally entitled to 
trial by jury, perhaps the supreme measure of formal process, despite living 
abroad and falling under the scope of an international treaty granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to a U.S. military tribunal.59  Although U.S. citizens 
targeted under the AUMF may not be entitled to such a strong form of 
procedural due process, the thrust of Reid implies that they enjoy some Fifth 
Amendment protections, especially given that matters of life and death are 
much more likely to receive constitutional protection.60  While American 
citizens targeted domestically for their suspected links to terrorism are 
virtually guaranteed to receive far greater due process,61 American citizens 
targeted abroad under the sweeping power of the AUMF are not without 
procedural protection.62  American citizens are a unique class under the 
AUMF because they retain at least some modicum of procedural due process 
protection regardless of their location.63 
D.  Justifying the Extrajudicial Drone Execution of an American Citizen 
The DOJ White Memo provides incredible insight into how the executive 
reconciles the modicum of procedural due process guaranteed to American 
citizens abroad and the AUMF’s broad authority to conduct drone 
executions.64  Originally a classified internal executive memo, public access 
to the DOJ White Memo only resulted from a tense legal battle for more 
information about Aulaqi’s execution.65  After Aulaqi’s death, the New York 
Times and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the DOJ under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking disclosure of documents 
 
 57. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 270 (1990) (holding that 
fundamental elements of the Fifth Amendment travel with citizens abroad); cf. Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769–71 (1950). 
 58. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 59. Id. at 16–17, 40–41. 
 60. See id. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In such cases [involving capital punishment] 
the law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural fairness which inheres in a 
civilian trial . . . .”). 
 61. Federal criminal prosecution of domestic terror suspects relies upon numerous 
substantive statutes. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF 
RIGHTS IN MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 8–9 
(2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4VT-T2HU].  U.S. 
federal courts have been internationally recognized for their “stringent procedural protection” 
of terror suspects. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain:  Detention of Terrorism 
Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 163–67 (2013). 
 62. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264, 270; Reid, 354 U.S. at 40–41, 77. 
 63. See supra notes 55–57.  Noncitizens generally lack constitutional protection outside 
the United States. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) 
(“Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign 
territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . .”). 
 64. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38–41. 
 65. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 103–08 (2d Cir.), opinion 
amended on denial of reh’g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.), and supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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detailing the executive’s rationale and methodology behind targeting a U.S. 
citizen for drone execution.66  Although FOIA is designed to facilitate the 
disclosure of previously unreleased information from the government, the 
New York Times and ACLU faced a tumultuous and grueling legal battle.67  
However, after nearly four years, they eventually succeeded in obtaining the 
release of the government’s procedure for the targeted drone killing of an 
American—the DOJ White Memo.68 
Although the publicly released memo was redacted to remove classified 
information and limited to disclosing solely legal analysis, it remains an 
invaluable resource when assessing why the government opined that the Fifth 
Amendment would not “preclude the contemplated lethal action” against 
Aulaqi.69  The DOJ White Memo acknowledged that, as a U.S. citizen, 
various elements of the Fifth Amendment shielded Aulaqi even while abroad 
in Yemen.70  The DOJ White Memo roughly utilized the balancing test 
devised in Mathews v. Eldridge to assess the requisite measure of due process 
owed Aulaqi:  weighing the private interest affected by the official action 
against the government’s interest, while considering the burden of providing 
greater process.71  Although much of the government’s reasoning is 
unavailable to the public, the DOJ White Memo asserts that the “imminent” 
threat Aulaqi posed to the American people significantly increased the 
government’s interest in maintaining national security.72  The determination 
that capturing Aulaqi would be “infeasible” likely supported the 
government’s notion that providing greater due process would have been 
difficult.73 
The DOJ White Memo recognized that the risk of an unjustified execution 
in the absence of sufficient process is an especially pertinent concern during 
wartime.74  However, the weight of the government’s interest in nullifying 
what it singularly deemed an imminent threat, coupled with “the realities of 
combat,” was deemed to override any constitutional demand for additional 
process.75  In coming to this determination, nearly one-third of the 
government’s analysis relied on foreign jurisprudence.76  The DOJ White 
 
 66. Id. at 103–05. 
 67. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 
104–08.  Before suing, representatives from the New York Times and the ACLU filed 
numerous FOIA requests to the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, CIA, and Department of 
Defense, all of which were all denied. N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 106–07.  The New York 
Times and ACLU also had to overcome the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the government. Id. at 108. 
 68. N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 103. 
 69. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 39. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 40. 
 74. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. (citing HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 
504 (2006)).  See infra notes 202–07 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
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Memo did not explicitly balance Aulaqi’s private life interest against the 
other factors from the Mathews test, but instead asserted that the burden 
imposed by the “circumstances of war,” together with the government’s 
interest in neutralizing a perceived threat, justified the proposed execution 
under the procedural requirements of the Fifth Amendment.77  Although 
deemed an imminent threat, over a year elapsed between the date of the DOJ 
White Memo and Aulaqi’s execution.78 
E.  Executive War-Making Authority and Unilateralism Within 
a Federal Government of Divided Powers 
In less than three pages, the DOJ White Memo concluded that the 
executive could unilaterally assume the roles of prosecutor, jury, and 
executioner and could kill an American citizen without affording any formal 
process.79  Although the executive has broad authority to conduct military 
affairs,80 our federal government is founded upon a delicate framework of 
diffuse power.81  This system of checks and balances prevents one political 
branch from developing tyrannical power.82  Examining traditional and 
modern notions of the scope of executive war power within the greater 
framework of the federal government provides insight into the executive’s 
authority to act as a prosecutor, jury, and executioner when targeting an 
American under the AUMF.  This Part details historical views of unilateral 
executive military power, analyzes contemporary interpretations of this 
power, and describes how the political question doctrine can protect the 
executive’s unilateral war-making power. 
1.  Founding Conceptualizations of Executive Military Authority 
Literature from the Framers of the U.S. Constitution provides valuable 
conceptualizations of the limits of executive war power.  Reeling from the 
injustices of the British monarchy leading up to the Revolutionary War, the 
Framers were reluctant to imbue any branch of the federal government with 
unchecked discretionary power and risk restarting another cycle of tyranny 
and revolution.83  James Madison, hailed as the “Father of the 
 
executive’s reliance on foreign jurisprudence when assessing the constitutional rights of a U.S. 
citizen. 
 77. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39–40 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530).  See 
infra Part II for an analysis of all elements of the Mathews test. 
 78. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 1. 
 79. See id. at 38–41. 
 80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“[The Framers] rested the structure of our central government on the system of 
checks and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it 
was a felt necessity.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 
205–06 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
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Constitution,”84 articulated that the Constitution’s checks and balances 
ensured federal power was both “necessary to the public good” and 
sufficiently limited to prevent “a perversion of the power to the public 
detriment.”85  Qualified power served as a guiding principle to Madison’s 
constitutional contributions.86 
Nowhere is the notion of qualified power more apparent than in the 
Federalists’ literature surrounding executive military affairs.87  In one of the 
earliest publications of The Federalist Papers, John Jay endorsed a unified 
republic over the boundless power of a monarchy to prevent military action 
“not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of [the] people.”88  
Alexander Hamilton similarly noted that the distribution of war powers 
among multiple branches prevented the executive from developing sovereign 
military powers and degrading democracy into despotism.89  Although the 
congressionally enacted AUMF evidences legislative consent to the 
executive’s power to make war, its broad language enables executive 
discretion and unilateralism that resemble a sovereign military power90—a 
status quo starkly antagonistic to the Framer’s views on executive military 
authority.91 
Madison envisioned “constitutional barriers” as a shield against 
unilateralism and sovereign tyranny, even during tenuous periods of national 
crisis and war.92  Early Supreme Court jurisprudence quickly recognized the 
federal judiciary as one such constitutional barrier.93  Shortly after the 
ratification of the Constitution, the Court staked out its role as the ultimate 
protector of constitutional liberties and the arbiter between the political 
branches.94  In Marbury v. Madison,95 the Court recognized its purpose as 
 
 84. Who’s the Father of the Constitution?, LIBRARY CONGRESS (May 2005), 
https://www.loc.gov/wiseguide/may05/constitution.html [https://perma.cc/LB8B-YMHM].  
Despite Madison’s political and philosophical sophistication, it is worth noting that his 
conceptualizations of race and civil liberties, along with many of the Framers, fall quite short 
when examined under a modern lens. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, DARK BARGAIN:  
SLAVERY, PROFITS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 110 (2009) (acknowledging 
that Madison proposed and formalized the adoption of the infamous Three-Fifths Clause 
during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia). 
 85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 206 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 347–50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 18–19 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 19 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 89. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“In 
this respect [as Commander-in-Chief] his authority would be nominally the same with that of 
the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.”); see also id. at 347–50. 
 90. See supra Part I.B. 
 91. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 207 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“It is in vain 
to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.”). 
 93. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166–67 (1803). 
 94. Id. at 167 (“The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, 
and must be tried by the judicial authority.”).  The Court recognized its own constitutionally 
vested power of final review for both executive and legislative action. Id. 
 95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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not only monitoring the constitutionality of government action but also 
establishing whether a given right was vested by the Constitution.96  The 
Court swiftly asserted the judiciary’s ability to temper executive actions that 
threatened constitutionally vested rights of citizens, even in light of 
legislative authority.97  Although over two hundred years old, this judicial 
empowerment remains highly relevant today:  the Court has repeatedly 
rebuffed abusive executive actions made pursuant to the AUMF, recognized 
the limits of the Act’s authority, and remedied the resulting infringements of 
constitutional rights.98 
2.  Contemporary Views of Presidential War Power 
Modern understandings of executive war power are largely grounded on 
the tripartite framework introduced by Justice Robert H. Jackson’s seminal 
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.99  Jackson 
understood presidential authority as existing within a three-tiered hierarchy: 
1.  When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes 
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . 
2.  When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, 
but there is a zone of twilight . . . . 
3.  When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .100 
Jackson’s framework has been consistently used to evaluate executive 
action since its inception.101  In the context of the War on Terror, the 
AUMF’s broad language102 provides, at the very least, congressional 
authorization for limited detention power103 and targeted killings.104  The 
AUMF’s authorization for the executive to employ “all necessary and 
 
 96. Id. at 167. 
 97. Id. at 176 (“To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be 
restrained?”).  Constitutional rights always trump congressional grants of authority. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 99. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 635–37 (footnote omitted). 
 101. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015); 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–25 (2008); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983); 
see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (finding Jackson’s tripartite 
framework “analytically useful” for evaluating executive action as a “spectrum running from 
explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition”). 
 102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 103. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of 
authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for 
the duration of the relevant conflict . . . .”). 
 104. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Keynote Address at the Wilson Center:  The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s 
Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-
and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy [https://perma.cc/PQ9P-FAQH] (addressing targeted 
drone executions). 
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appropriate force” does not carve out any exceptions for actions taken against 
U.S. citizens.105  Thus, it is very likely that an executive drone execution of 
a U.S. citizen pursuant to the AUMF is a demonstration of presidential power 
at its strongest ebb under Jackson’s tripartite framework.106 
3.  The President’s Shield:  The Political Question Doctrine 
The adage “the best defense is a good offense” has rung true for 
centuries.107  In those terms, the political question doctrine provides the 
executive with an incredible defense:  to effectuate the separation of powers, 
it bars the judiciary from scrutinizing the merits of fundamentally political 
executive determinations, which include presidential decisions to initiate 
military action.108  Under this doctrine, the judiciary abstains from reviewing 
challenges to the wisdom of the president’s national policymaking.109  For 
such determinations, the executive is solely accountable to the voting public 
and “his own conscience.”110  However, while the judiciary is barred from 
evaluating the wisdom of national political determinations, the political 
question doctrine does not prevent the judiciary from reviewing the legality 
of such decisions.111 
Roughly ten months prior to Aulaqi’s execution, the government 
successfully invoked the political question doctrine to prevent judicial 
resolution of the executive’s impending death sentence for Aulaqi.112  Upon 
learning that his son was added to an executive “kill list,” Aulaqi’s father 
brought suit questioning his son’s impending execution and seeking, among 
 
 105. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 107. See Letter from George Washington to John Trumbull (June 25, 1799), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-04-02-0120 [http://perma.cc/7GF6-
LSET] (“[O]ffensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only (in some cases) 
means of defence.”). 
 108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. 
Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The state-secrets privilege also 
protects executive unilateralism and may be invoked by the government to block evidence or 
completely bar adjudication to prevent the release of classified information. United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876).  This Note 
will exempt discussion of the state-secrets privilege and its relationship to executive 
unilateralism given that the District Court for the District of Columbia strongly rebuffed the 
government’s invocation of this privilege when assessing whether Aulaqi’s execution 
presented an infringement of procedural due process. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. 
Supp. 3d 56, 81 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting the government’s “truculent opposition” made the case 
“unnecessarily difficult”). 
 109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66 (“The subjects [of exclusive executive 
discretion] are political.  They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to 
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus., 607 F.3d at 842 (“[T]he presence of a political question . . . 
turns not on the nature of the government conduct under review but more precisely on the 
question the plaintiff raises about the challenged action.”); see also Schneider v. Kissinger, 
412 F.3d 190, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 112. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (Aulaqi I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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other things, a preliminary injunction to stop the government’s proposed 
execution unless concrete standards were implemented and satisfied.113  The 
court in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama114 (Aulaqi I) held that the political question 
doctrine barred judicial review of Aulaqi’s links to terrorist groups, the extent 
of his alleged terrorist activity, and his inclusion on an executive “kill list” 
because such inquiries scrutinized the merits of discretionary executive 
policymaking as opposed to questioning the legality of such decisions.115  
The government’s motion to dismiss was granted and Aulaqi was executed 
within a year.116 
After Aulaqi’s death, his father once again brought suit against the 
government, this time seeking redress for his son’s execution.117  The same 
court that had previously dismissed his case in Aulaqi I found this second suit 
was not barred from judicial review under the political question doctrine.118  
The complaint in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta119 (Aulaqi II) focused on the 
executive’s alleged infringement of due process rights and other 
constitutional liberties.120  Shifting away from evaluating discretionary 
executive decisions toward the legality of executive action resulted in 
justiciable subject matter.121  Despite recognizing that Aulaqi’s execution 
presented a plausible due process claim,122 the court was forced to dismiss 
the case after finding that no remedy under U.S. law could provide relief.123  
The executive escaped culpability for Aulaqi’s execution a second time.124 
II.  A THUMB ON THE SCALE:  THE BALANCING ACT OF PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND DRONE EXECUTIONS 
The judiciary’s recognition of a potential due process infringement arising 
from the outer limits of executive power warrants a deeper inquiry.125  The 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,126 used by both the government in the 
DOJ White Memo127 and the Supreme Court in assessing due process issues 
arising from the War on Terror,128 guides an exploration of the executive’s 
unilateral methodology for the drone execution of an American citizen.  
 
 113. Id. at 12. 
 114. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 115. Id. at 52.  The court also found that Aulaqi’s father lacked standing to bring a claim 
on Aulaqi’s behalf, who theoretically could have appeared in court himself despite being 
added to an executive “kill list.” Id. at 35. 
 116. Id. at 54; see Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 117. Aulaqi II, 35 F. Supp. at 58–59. 
 118. Id. at 70.  In Aulaqi II, Aulaqi’s father was unhindered by any issues of standing 
because he was bringing a claim on behalf of a decedent. See id. at 59. 
 119. 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 120. Id. at 70. 
 121. Id. at 69. 
 122. Id. at 74. 
 123. Id. at 80. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 73–74. 
 126. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 127. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39–41. 
 128. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
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While the DOJ White Memo did not explicitly balance all of the Mathews 
factors,129 this Note fully examines each factor to assess whether additional 
measures of process should be implemented to prevent an unjustified drone 
execution.130  This Part maps the Mathews test’s four elements:  Part II.A 
analyzes the private life interest of American citizens targeted for drone 
execution under the AUMF, while Part II.B explores the government’s 
underlying national security interests in drone strikes.  Part II.C scrutinizes 
the risk of an unjustified execution or erroneous loss of life under the 
executive’s current methodology, and Part II.D examines the benefits of 
implementing a system of judicial review to reduce the risk of an unjustified 
drone execution. 
A.  Private Life Interest of Drone Targets 
The exploration of procedural due process concerns underlying drone 
strikes targeting Americans commences by evaluating the first prong of the 
Mathews test:  the private citizen’s interest affected by the official action.131  
This private interest is an individual citizen’s right to life, liberty, or 
property.132 
Drone executions are not intended to maim, injure, or merely frighten their 
victims—the government shoots to kill.133  Thus, the private citizen’s interest 
at stake in a drone strike is the private citizen’s life.134  Not only traditionally 
revered since the dawn of legal scholarship135 and explicitly enumerated 
within the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment,136 the protection of a citizen’s 
life also enjoys the utmost consideration by our highest court: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from 
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts.  One’s right to life . . . and other fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.137 
Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the value of the private life interest at risk 
in drone executions.  No other private interest is as incapable of redress upon 
 
 129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; supra Parts II.A–D. 
 131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 132. See id.; see also Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 894–96 (1961). 
 133. See Brennan, supra note 104. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 (describing the Magna 
Carta’s protection of “personal security” as encompassing “a person’s legal and uninterrupted 
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation”). 
 136. See supra note 9. 
 137. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985) (“The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal 
proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling.”). 
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deprivation or as inherently valuable as one’s own life.138  The private life 
interest is in a singular class of individual rights that are irretrievable upon 
deprivation. 
Supreme Court deliberations on the government’s deprivation of a U.S. 
citizen’s liberty interest are a useful comparative measure to assess the 
magnitude of a citizen’s life interest. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,139 a U.S. citizen 
designated as an enemy combatant was captured in Afghanistan pursuant to 
the AUMF and eventually detained in a naval brig in South Carolina without 
formal charges, access to an impartial tribunal, or any assistance of legal 
counsel.140  The detainee’s father petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, 
alleging that the government’s lack of formal process infringed his son’s 
Fifth Amendment rights.141  Through an analysis guided by the Mathews 
balancing test, a plurality of the Court found that the AUMF’s grant of 
“necessary and appropriate force” did not authorize indefinite detention, as 
the government had argued.142  Furthermore, the plurality determined that 
the citizen-detainee must be informed of the factual basis for his detention 
and provided a reasonable opportunity to protest his detainment.143  The 
plurality also acted to lessen the government’s burden in recognizing the 
citizen-detainee’s liberty interest by permitting the “realities of combat” to 
relax the requisite measure of due process owed to the detainee144 and 
lessening evidentiary burdens during detainment proceedings.145 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ensured that at least some formal 
measures of due process accompanied the deprivation of a liberty interest to 
comport with constitutional guarantees.146  In Woodson v. North Carolina,147 
Justice Potter Stewart masterfully articulated the vast difference between the 
indefinite deprivation of liberty at risk in Hamdi and the permanent 
termination of life at risk in drone executions:  “Death, in its finality, differs 
more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of 
only a year or two.”148  Given that a life interest is unequivocally more 
 
 138. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (“An 
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of 
correction.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976) (noting that death is a 
“unique and irreversible penalty”). 
 139. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 140. Id. at 510–11. 
 141. Id. at 511. 
 142. Id. at 520–21. 
 143. Id. at 533. 
 144. Id. at 531. 
 145. Id. at 533–34 (“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable 
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”). 
 146. See id. at 530 (“[A]s critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those 
who actually pose an immediate threat . . . history and common sense teach us that an 
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and 
abuse . . . .”). 
 147. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 148. Id. at 305. 
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valuable than a liberty interest,149 Hamdi implies that some measure of 
formal process should necessarily accompany decisions that could result in 
the deprivation of a citizen’s life.150 
Four years after Hamdi was decided, the Supreme Court held that 
noncitizens are also entitled to formal measures of due process when detained 
pursuant to the AUMF.151  This holding further supports the notion that 
American citizens targeted for drone execution under the AUMF deserve 
some manner of formal procedural protection.  First, U.S. citizens 
undoubtedly enjoy stronger constitutional protection than noncitizens in 
times of war.152  Second, a drone execution poses a much more punitive 
sentence than interim detainment153—as noted above, the permanent 
deprivation of a private life interest is infinitely weightier than the temporary 
deprivation of a private liberty interest.154  If even noncitizens are afforded 
bilateral measures of due process in connection with the deprivation of a 
liberty interest,155 it certainly follows that the magnitude of an American 
citizen’s private life interest deserves at least some formal measure of 
procedural protection.156 
However, some would argue that the benefits of U.S. citizenship should 
not extend to those who may be actively seeking the destruction of the United 
States.157  Under such an analysis, those who forfeit their allegiance to 
America by aligning themselves with a group targeted under the AUMF are 
undeserving of any due process protection, regardless of the high value the 
Supreme Court has associated with a private citizen’s life interest.158  Despite 
this appeal to base emotion, the Supreme Court has held that treasonous 
activity does not diminish the private interest of a U.S. citizen when assessing 
that citizen’s due process rights.159  Moreover, U.S. citizenship, and its 
 
 149. See id. (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long.”); see also supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (“[T]he threats to military operations posed by a basic 
system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights . . . .”); 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
 151. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008) (holding that noncitizens detained 
as enemy combatants under the AUMF were entitled to have the merits of their detention 
reviewed by both executive military officers in tribunal proceedings and Article III judges in 
federal courts). 
 152. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (“It is war that exposes the 
relative vulnerability of the alien’s status.”); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 794 (noting that, in related cases, detainees had been 
imprisoned for six years without judicial oversight). 
 154. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
 155. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795. 
 156. See id.; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; see also supra notes 135–38, 149 and 
accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., Jim Moret, What Rights Should Terrorists Have?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 20, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-moret/what-rights-should-
terror_b_3123290.html [https://perma.cc/KRB4-9S48] (arguing that a suspected terrorist 
forfeits the advantages of U.S. citizenship when he declares war on his country). 
 158. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 159. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (“Nor is the weight on [the private 
interest] side of the Mathews scale offset by . . . the accusation of treasonous behavior.”). 
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associated constitutional protection, can stem from purely geographical 
qualities that are wholly unrelated to an individual’s actions or loyalties.160  
Once bestowed, the constitutional benefits of U.S. citizenship are utterly 
inalienable. 
B.  Government’s Interest in National Security 
The investigation of procedural due process rights and drone executions 
targeting Americans continues with the second prong of the Mathews test:  
the government’s interest in carrying out the official action.161  This interest 
drives the actions of federal actors who, in turn, affect the private citizen’s 
interest in life, liberty, or property.162 
AUMF drone strikes are an indispensable element of the United States’s 
global counterterrorism strategy that protects American citizens.163  National 
security has long been recognized as a deeply persuasive, if not the most 
persuasive, government interest.164  Much like a citizen’s life interest, the 
executive’s broad control over the military is explicitly enumerated within 
the Constitution.165  Alexander Hamilton provided one of the earliest 
conceptualizations linking this remarkable grant of power to demanding the 
vigorous maintenance of our nation’s borders and fiercely protecting the lives 
of American citizens.166  Over two centuries later, Hamilton’s arguments for 
a strong and “energetic” executive remain highly relevant:  the former legal 
advisor to the Bush administration explicitly relied on Hamilton’s reasoning 
when interpreting the executive’s constitutionally enumerated military power 
as a preeminent responsibility to anticipate and defend against foreign 
attacks.167  This responsibility could naturally extend to employing drone 
strikes to preemptively neutralize the threat posed by dangerous 
individuals.168  The Constitution’s explicit grant of presidential military 
 
 160. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth:  (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof . . . .”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) (“Citizenship is not a license 
that expires upon misbehavior.”); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135–36 (1868) (“The right to 
life and to personal safety is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is 
inalienable.” (emphasis added)). 
 161. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
 164. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.  It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Of all the cares or 
concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which 
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”). 
 167. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor 
or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 489–90 (2002). 
 168. See id. at 487–88. 
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power provides nearly peerless authority for recognizing national security as 
an utmost and robust government interest. 
The authoritative interpreters of the Constitution have consistently arrived 
at a similar conclusion.  In Haig v. Agee,169 Chief Justice Warren Burger 
declared that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest 
is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”170  Chief Justice Earl 
Warren similarly recognized national security as one of the “weightiest 
considerations” when assessing due process rights.171  The pages of history 
provide further validation of the incredible latitude given to the executive in 
matters of national security:  in the Prize Cases,172 the Court commended 
President Lincoln’s preemptive blockade of Southern ports during the Civil 
War absent an official congressional declaration of war.173  More recently, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized the value of preventive military 
action by acknowledging the government’s interest in detaining individuals 
who pose an impending threat to the lives of U.S. citizens as “crucially 
important” and “critical.”174  The Court’s continued endorsement of 
preventive military action supports the executive’s use of the AUMF to carry 
out preemptive drone strikes against imminent threats.175  The AUMF is an 
integral component of the government’s mighty interest in maintaining our 
nation’s post-9/11 security blanket and fighting the War on Terror.176  
However, drone executions of Americans advance a grim question:  Under 
what circumstances can taking one citizen’s life preemptively be justified to 
potentially save many others’ lives? 
C.  The Risk of an Unjustified Drone Execution 
Explicit constitutional enumerations and powerful Supreme Court 
jurisprudence firmly entrench both the private citizen’s life interest and the 
government’s interest in preserving national security.  The third prong of the 
Mathews procedural due process test ascertains the likelihood that the 
government’s actions would cause the erroneous deprivation of a private 
citizen’s interest in life, liberty, or property.177  The risk of an erroneous 
deprivation is the likelihood that the government’s actions would 
unjustifiably affect an individual’s life, liberty, or property rights in the 
absence of sufficient due process.178  Assessing the risk of erroneous 
 
 169. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
 170. Id. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)). 
 171. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1965) (holding that the plaintiff’s right to travel to 
Cuba, a “liberty” under the Fifth Amendment, was trumped by national security concerns 
stemming from the Cuban Missile Crisis). 
 172. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)  
 173. See id. at 669 (“The President was bound to meet [the Civil War] in the shape it 
presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to 
it by him or them could change the fact.” (emphasis added)). 
 174. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520, 530 (2004). 
 175. Cf. id. 
 176. See id. at 510; Kelly, supra note 33; see also supra Parts I.A–B. 
 177. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 178. Id. 
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deprivation is the cornerstone of procedural due process evaluations and an 
integral component of the Mathews test.179  In the context of AUMF drone 
strikes, the risk of erroneous deprivation is the probability that the executive 
targets and executes an innocent individual.180  The high value of an 
individual’s right to life substantially raises the stakes of this assessment:  
while property can be returned or compensated for, death is irreversible.181  
Avoiding the unjustified or mistaken deprivation of life is of the utmost 
importance.182 
Strikingly, the executive never formally charged Aulaqi in connection with 
plotting, aiding, or committing an act of terror before his execution.183  The 
absence of formal charges eviscerated any opportunity for Aulaqi to 
understand the nature of his alleged crimes or to protest such claims.184  
Indictments and formal charges make criminal proceedings legitimate.185  
Few legal principles are more fundamental than articulating the nature of a 
suspect’s crimes before enacting punishment.186  The Magna Carta 
recognized this cardinal tenet over 800 years ago:  “No freeman shall be 
seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way 
destroyed . . . except[] by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of 
the land.”187  In Aulaqi’s case, the executive provided no discernible method 
to stake out which “law of the land” was violated and instead substituted legal 
examination by peers for execution by adversary.188  Executive officials 
made their own classified determination of the illegality of the citizen’s 
actions and refused to abide by traditional criminal process or sentencing.189  
The absence of formal charges and standard criminal process removes an 
integral grounding mechanism for executive discretion and eliminates any 
opportunity to understand or refute the alleged illegality prior to execution, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of an unjustified execution and the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation. 
Another grounding mechanism for executive power is public 
accountability and, by extension, the decisions of the voting public in 
 
 179. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are 
meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (“[P]rocedural 
due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process . . . .”). 
 180. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 344. 
 181. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934 (1997); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972). 
 186. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (“The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from 
a mere formalism.  It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice.”). 
 187. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215) (emphasis added). 
 188. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 5–6, 12 and accompanying text. 
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elections.190  The wisdom of the executive’s political decisions, albeit outside 
the realm of the judicial review,191 is subject to constant evaluation by the 
voting public and their elected representatives.192  Public scrutiny limits 
executive discretion.193  Employing a secretive, internal procedure to carry 
out the drone execution of a U.S. citizen enables the executive to distance 
itself from the laws and procedures publicly elected officials enacted to 
combat terrorism.194  In turn, this methodology marginalizes the public’s 
voting decisions and minimizes the impact of public accountability on 
executive decision-making.195  The absence of meaningful public 
accountability erases another necessary check on executive discretion and 
further magnifies the possibility that an AUMF drone strike erroneously 
deprives an American citizen’s life. 
Beyond eschewing standard criminal process, the executive’s calculated 
unilateralism also significantly increases the risk of an unjustified execution.  
The DOJ White Memo asserts that “a decision-maker could reasonably 
decide that the threat posed by al-Aulaqi’s activities to United States persons 
is ‘continued’ and ‘imminent.’”196  This argument implies that a federal 
judge (the aforementioned “decision-maker”) would likely sanction a 
citizen’s execution as a valid response to the “imminent threat of violence or 
death.”197  Executive officials are inserting their own analysis of imminence 
and assuming a federal judge would agree.198  However, federal judges are 
the experts on evaluating imminence, not the executive:  imminence is a legal 
standard federal judges authoritatively determine as a regular component of 
federal standing.199  Supplanting a “decision-maker[’s]” legal expertise with 
 
 190. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (arguing that the executive’s “due dependence 
on the people” is the primary “ingredient” to preserve republican and democratic values). 
 191. See supra Part I.E.3. 
 192. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 193. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 194. See Karen J. Greenberg, Prosecuting Terrorists in Civilian Courts Still Works, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/isis-
trump-terrorist-obama-court-military-guantanamo/546296/ [https://perma.cc/HFG7-GLZG] 
(recognizing the viability of federal courts to successfully try terrorism subjects under 
domestic U.S. law). 
 195. The appointment of chief federal prosecutors, who try terrorism cases on behalf of the 
government, is subject to Senate confirmation and is an extension of public voting decisions. 
Direct Election of Senators, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm [https://perma.cc/V2QH-NGF5] (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018); see, e.g., Benjamin Mueller et al., Prosecutors Describe Driver’s Plan to Kill 
in Manhattan Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
11/01/nyregion/driver-had-been-planning-attack-in-manhattan-for-weeks-police-say.html 
[https://perma.cc/VX4G-KYT9] (describing the role of federal prosecutors in pursuing an 
alleged terrorist). 
 196. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39 (quoting a redacted source). 
 197. Id. at 39, 40. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) 
(holding that Article III standing requires that “the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, 
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unqualified executive judgment risks creating differing standards of 
imminence and dramatically increases the possibility of an unjustified drone 
execution and an erroneous death. 
Beyond a unilateral determination of imminence, the DOJ White Memo’s 
recommended methodology entails the executive exclusively assessing the 
constitutional rights of an American citizen.200  In doing so, the executive 
singularly defines the extent of procedural due process afforded a citizen 
targeted for drone execution.201  Additionally, the DOJ White Memo 
evidenced executive reliance on Israeli jurisprudence to justify the absence 
of formal process afforded Aulaqi.202  However, the executive is not 
equipped to unilaterally assess the boundaries of constitutional liberties—as 
noted over 200 years ago in Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary is the 
unparalleled and supreme interpreter of the Constitution.203  The judiciary is 
solely empowered to declare the existence and extent of constitutional rights, 
such as procedural due process minimums.204  The harm posed by the 
executive’s unqualified analysis of procedural due process rights is 
magnified by its reliance on foreign jurisprudence.205  As Justice Breyer 
succinctly noted:  “[F]oreign authority does not bind us.  After all, we are 
interpreting a ‘Constitution for the United States of America.’”206  The 
executive’s reliance on foreign jurisprudence is especially conspicuous given 
it is employing non-U.S. law to constrain the scope of rights explicitly 
granted under the Fifth Amendment—in other words, the executive is 
deploying foreign law to limit supreme domestic law.207  The executive 
unilaterally gauging the requisite due process mandated by the Constitution, 
and supporting such propositions with foreign jurisprudence that narrows 
domestic law, greatly increases the likelihood that an American citizen could 
be unjustifiably targeted and executed via drone strike.  The executive’s 
 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 
(1983))).  The standard of “imminent harm” has been evaluated by federal judges in a plethora 
of contexts. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–13 (2013) 
(wiretapping foreign contacts); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (lethal injection); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007) (pending patent 
prosecution); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1996) (contaminated soil); 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1992) (endangered animals). 
 200. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38–41. 
 201. See id. 
 202. Id. at 40 (noting that “arrest, investigation and trial” may be impracticable (quoting 
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 504 (2006))). 
 203. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 204. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–67; see supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 205. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari) (asserting that the Supreme Court “should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari); see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 32, 86 (2005) (“If foreign decisions are freely citable, any judge wanting a supporting 
citation has only to troll deeply enough in the world’s corpora juris to find it.”). 
 206. Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868, n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 207. See supra notes 9, 200–02 and accompanying text. 
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unilateral methodology, as evidenced throughout the DOJ White Memo, 
greatly increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of life. 
D.  Judicial Review as a Safeguard Against 
the Erroneous Deprivation of Life 
The final element of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test analyzes the 
potential benefit of implementing additional procedural safeguards to ensure 
against an erroneous deprivation.208  The abuses of the AUMF drone 
program have prompted various proposals incorporating judicial review as a 
means of providing additional due process and safeguarding against 
unjustified executions.209  The wide spectrum of proposed judicial solutions 
can be segregated into ex ante review (i.e., preemptive judicial review of 
proposed drone strikes)210 and ex post review (i.e., implementing an effective 
post hoc legal regime that enables courts to provide meaningful relief for the 
families of those killed by unjustified drone strikes).211  Part II.D.1 examines 
the significant benefits of the judiciary reviewing AUMF drone executions 
targeting American citizens, and Part II.D.2 surveys the foundational aspects 
of ex ante and ex post regimes. 
1.  The Merits of Judicial Review 
While some may shudder at imposing a judicial check on the sphere of 
military power explicitly accorded the executive,212 it remains integral to a 
federal government of divided powers.213  Justice Anthony Kennedy vividly 
articulated the necessity of the judiciary reviewing executive war-making 
authority: 
 
 208. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  While a plethora of potential 
safeguards could be implemented to reduce the possibility of an unjustified drone execution, 
this Note will solely examine two popular judicial solutions:  ex post and ex ante judicial 
review. 
 209. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Drones Are Focus as C.I.A. Nominee Goes 
Before Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/ 
senate-panel-will-question-brennan-on-targeted-killings.html [https://perma.cc/T9KH-
CAE8]; Scott Shane, Debating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/a-court-to-vet-kill-lists.html [https://perma.cc/ 
362Z-GXR2]; Editorial, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targeted-
killings.html [https://perma.cc/Y2AA-79AA]. 
 210. See generally Jeh Johnson, Former Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Keynote Address at 
the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School:  A “Drone Court”:  Some Pros and 
Cons (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeh-johnson-speech-drone-court-some-
pros-and-cons [https://perma.cc/Y33A-6MQD]. 
 211. See generally Joshua Andresen, Note, Due Process of War in the Age of Drones, 41 
YALE J. INT’L L. 155 (2016). 
 212. See supra Part II.B; see also Neomi Rao, Real Drone Strike Accountability Requires 
Political Checks, N.Y. TIMES:  ROOM FOR DEBATE (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes/real-drone-strike-
accountability-requires-political-checks [https://perma.cc/9UNM-2KXR] (arguing that 
Congress should provide the necessary political solutions to curb transparency and due process 
concerns irrespective of the federal judiciary). 
 213. See supra Parts I.E.1–2. 
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Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.  Chief among 
these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal 
liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. . . . 
Our opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as 
Commander in Chief.  On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is 
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.214 
Justice Kennedy espoused the value of the political branches engaging in 
“genuine debate” over how to best preserve constitutional values while 
fending off the threat of terrorism.215  The Court has held that the limits of 
military discretion, which could include targeting an American citizen for 
drone execution, is one such area of “genuine debate” reserved exclusively 
for the judiciary.216 
Originalist critics fearful of judicial overreach need not worry:  Justice 
Kennedy’s conceptualization of separation of powers is not isolated nor 
modernist; rather, as noted above, this viewpoint has been consistently 
articulated since the days of the Framers.217  Hamilton, Jay, and Madison all 
championed a system of checks and balances that restrained executive 
authority from devolving into tyrannical rule empowered by reckless military 
discretion.218  Marbury v. Madison recognized the ability of the judiciary to 
temper executive authority whenever constitutionally vested rights come 
under siege, even by actions purportedly supported by federal legislation.219  
In the Framers’ eyes, the judiciary ensures that broad federal legislation—
such as the AUMF—can never grant free rein to the executive over the 
military and the constitutional rights of American citizens. 
However, we do not live in the colonial era of the Framers and 200-year-
old conceptualizations of diffuse federal power are not necessarily 
determinative.220  Per Justice Jackson’s modern tripartite framework for 
analyzing executive power, the AUMF’s explicit congressional authorization 
of executive war-making power elevates presidential power to its strongest 
ebb.221  However, the judiciary has consistently established that it is fully 
empowered to review and rebuff executive actions made pursuant to the 
AUMF.222  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected 
the government’s claim that the AUMF authorized indefinite detention.223  In 
 
 214. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). 
 215. Id. at 798. 
 216. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable limits of 
military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are 
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 217. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 218. Id.; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth 
of this country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”). 
 219. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66, 176–77 (1803); see also supra 
notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 220. See generally Aaron Blake, Neil Gorsuch, Antonin Scalia and Originalism, Explained, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/ 
01/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalia-and-originalism-explained/ [https://perma.cc/JEC5-XA7S]. 
 221. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 223. 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,224 the Court rejected the government’s assertion that 
the AUMF enabled the executive to convene military commissions.225  In 
Hamlily v. Obama,226 a court found that the AUMF does not authorize the 
detention of those who “substantially support” al-Qaeda but are not a part of 
it, again rejecting the government’s assertion of its detention authority under 
the AUMF.227  Even when the executive is vested with the strongest possible 
level of authority via the AUMF,228 presidential power always remains 
subject to judicial scrutiny and tempering.  The judiciary’s authority to rebuff 
executive discretion under the AUMF makes it the preeminent safeguard 
against an unjustified execution.  Put simply, “a state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.”229 
2.  The Spectrum of Judicial Assessment:  Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Review 
A tragic history of unintended civilian casualties, further compounded by 
Aulaqi’s execution, has produced a wide spectrum of proposals advocating 
for the implementation of judicial review to safeguard against the erroneous 
deprivation of life frequently associated with drone strikes.230  On one end 
of the spectrum, some have advocated for a preemptive, ex ante judicial 
check on proposed drone strikes targeting American citizens analogous to the 
surveillance courts currently in operation.231  These surveillance courts 
review classified information provided solely by the executive in 
nonadversarial hearings before providing surveillance warrants.232  
Similarly, preemptive judicial review of proposed drone strikes would not 
resolve preexisting cases or controversies, but rather evaluate whether the 
proposed use of lethal force against an enemy combatant would be justified 
based upon classified information provided by the executive.233  Preemptive 
judicial review of proposed drone strikes targeting Americans would 
introduce an independent arbiter to examine the legal sufficiency of the 
executive’s evidence.234  Introducing an independent system of review could 
mitigate executive discretion and prevent drone strikes for which the 
executive lacks sufficient evidence, thereby reducing the risk of an 
unjustified drone execution.235  Theoretically, this approach may delay drone 
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strikes pending judicial decision and could be more burdensome for the 
executive.236 
On the other end of the judicial-safeguard spectrum, ex post review 
provides the opportunity for a retrospective adversarial hearing in which both 
the government and a private individual or entity can present evidence after 
a drone strike has occurred.237  Adversarial hearings provide increased 
“procedural legitimacy” and “substantive accuracy,” which can help victims 
of unjustified drone strikes find relief.238  These post hoc hearings would 
enable judges to examine a complete set of facts, which would not always be 
possible during preemptive ex ante review.239  While there is currently no 
remedy for families suing on behalf of American citizens killed by drone 
strikes,240 some have proposed the creation of a statutory right to nominal 
damages as the “least-worst” option to rein in AUMF drone strikes.241  
Legislation that provides for damages could incentivize increased executive 
diligence—both out of a desire to avoid the costs of being sued and the 
associated negative publicity—and potentially decrease the likelihood of an 
erroneous execution.242 
III.  AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE:  
IMPLEMENTING AN EX ANTE LEGAL REGIME 
TO PREVENT UNJUSTIFIED DRONE EXECUTIONS 
A high risk of the erroneous deprivation of life,243 coupled with incredibly 
weighty private and government interests,244 demand additional procedural 
protection to ensure that the next Aulaqi is not the victim of a potentially 
unjustified execution.245  Ex ante judicial review of proposed drone strikes is 
the superlative check on executive discretion and the best safeguard of the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process.  Part III.A identifies 
the pragmatic benefits offered by ex ante review that would be impracticable 
under any post hoc legal regime.  Part III.B details an ex ante methodology 
that respects the judiciary’s constitutionally vested authority but is not overly 
burdensome to the government’s vital interest in preserving national security. 
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A.  The Pragmatism of Ex Ante Review over Ex Post Review 
An ex ante legal regime is a supremely more effective means of supplying 
additional process and curbing executive excess than ex post review.  Ex ante 
review allows for the prevention of constitutional infringement that may 
otherwise be incapable of judicial redress.  In addition to highlighting the 
problematic standing requirements that may impede those seeking relief, 
Aulaqi I demonstrated the hardship imposed by the political question 
doctrine, which prohibited Aulaqi’s father from questioning his son’s 
inclusion on an executive “kill list” and effectively ended his efforts to stop 
his son’s impending execution.246  Aulaqi’s family was similarly denied 
relief in Aulaqi II—despite bringing a plausible due process claim—because 
no U.S. law could provide damages or other remedies.247  As such, ex post 
review would likely require a congressional remedy for damages to ensure 
any form of meaningful post hoc judicial process.248  However, the 
significant procedural burdens noted above would be nearly prohibitive for 
plaintiffs seeking relief from such a congressional remedy.  Many plaintiffs 
would be denied relief in an ex post regime simply because of how their 
complaint was framed249 or due to lack of standing.250  Ex post review hinges 
upon an inaccessible remedy that, given the immense value of human life, 
will necessarily be inadequate every time.251 
In contrast, preemptive judicial inquiries in an ex ante regime could be 
narrowly centered on evaluating legal concerns and thus not be barred under 
the political question doctrine.252  To avoid issues of justiciability under the 
political question doctrine, ex ante judicial review would not attack foreign 
policymaking but rather examine compliance with law and constitutional 
guarantees253—both of which are quintessential judicial functions.254  
Preemptive ex ante review can effectively sidestep the legal roadblocks that 
would make an ex post regime unworkable for plaintiffs seeking relief. 
Plaintiffs in an ex post review are not the only ones who would needlessly 
suffer.  The post hoc nature of ex post review makes it nearly impossible to 
prevent an unjustified drone execution, which effectively nullifies the value 
of the private citizen’s life interest in the due process calculus.255  The 
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executive’s record of abuse and mistreatment throughout the War on Terror 
provides a cautionary tale of the dangers posed by unchecked executive 
discretion.256  Ex ante review provides an opportunity to preemptively curb 
such discretion, while ex post review would do little, if anything, to slow the 
government’s escalating record of human rights abuses in the War on 
Terror.257  Ex ante review offers an invaluable preventive mechanism that 
lives up to the promises of our Constitution. 
B.  Toeing the Line:  A Narrow Ex Ante Legal Regime 
An ex ante regime to review proposed drone strikes could be efficiently 
implemented via congressional act.  Congress has already displayed its 
willingness to promulgate acts that create courts dedicated to specialized, 
preemptive review258 and has repeatedly rebuffed the AUMF’s expansive 
power.259  Ex ante review of proposed drone strikes must be precisely 
tailored to provide an additional layer of process without devolving into an 
undue burden on the government.260  To ensure that the executive is free to 
vigorously conduct counterterrorism operations overseas,261 ex ante review 
should be limited to instances where the executive believes it is necessary to 
target an American citizen.  Notwithstanding that noncitizens lack significant 
(if any) procedural due process rights outside the United States that would 
merit ex ante judicial review,262 this initial threshold significantly reduces 
the government’s burden by allowing them to conduct the vast majority of 
AUMF drone operations unfettered by judicial review.  Article III judges, as 
opposed to state judges, should be selected for ex ante review as they are the 
preeminent arbiters between the political branches and are uniquely equipped 
to assess the constitutional rights of citizens.263 
But how should such Article III judges be selected?  Permitting the 
executive to select judges would acquiesce to a new cycle of unilateralism 
and defeat the ideals of diffuse power inherent in independent review.264  
Rather, a panel of three federal judges should be selected randomly from the 
circuit court that has jurisdiction over the targeted citizen’s last known 
domicile in the United States.  This procedure ensures a randomized system 
of independent review by competent decision makers that would break the 
pattern of executive unilateralism.  A panel of three judges tips the due 
process scales in favor of the private citizen’s life interest and greatly 
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decreases the risk of erroneous deprivation by promoting a more thorough 
review than a single judge and decreasing the likelihood that the executive 
can coercively present evidence.  This balance is necessary given these 
hearings would be nonadversarial and would only involve evidence 
presented by the government.  However, heightened review from a panel is 
likely to be less timely than a single judge’s assessment and is therefore more 
burdensome to the government’s interest in robustly maintaining national 
security.265 
To offset this increased burden, the panel should only review information 
precisely tailored to the preeminent legal concept at stake:  whether the 
citizen poses an imminent threat.266  Given that Article III judges are solely 
qualified to make an authoritative determination of imminence in the context 
of the federal government, judicial review of the imminency of harm greatly 
reduces the risk of an unjustified execution.267  Prohibiting the executive 
from making an authoritative judgment on imminence will greatly improve 
the accuracy of the decision-making underlying drone executions and align 
ex ante drone proceedings with both the promises of the Fifth Amendment 
and the constitutional empowerments of the executive and the judiciary.268 
To further improve the integrity of these ex ante proceedings and to protect 
national security, all evidence presented to the panel should be redacted to 
remove identifying information about the proposed target’s identity.  Not 
only would these omissions lessen the executive’s evidentiary burden to 
comport with analogous Supreme Court precedent,269 it also decreases the 
likelihood of bias entering the panel’s determinations and greatly diminishes 
the probability that classified information could leak to the public and disrupt 
the executive’s proposed strike.270  If a majority of the panel believes the 
citizen poses an imminent threat, the proposed strike may proceed.  Requiring 
only a majority of the judges to sanction the strike lessens the burden on the 
government by ensuring that a single judge cannot exercise veto power. 
This methodology greatly refines the scope of evidence the executive must 
provide the panel of judges, which diminishes the government’s burden 
while still allowing for a thorough review of the integral legal concern at 
stake.  While fully recognizing both the executive’s military power271 and 
the judiciary’s constitutional authority,272 this legal regime reduces the 
likelihood of an unjustified execution by centering judicial review around the 
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imminency of harm posed by an American citizen.273  This system of 
preemptive review significantly reduces the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
and, in doing so, greatly diminishes the likelihood that a citizen’s procedural 
due process rights would be infringed under the Mathews test. 
CONCLUSION 
The executive’s harsh unilateral treatment of an American citizen’s most 
valuable private interest in the DOJ White Memo coupled with the 
recognition of a plausible due process claim incapable of redress in Aulaqi II 
scream for reform.  The high risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in the 
executive’s current methodology should be offset by allocating power to the 
federal branch most qualified to assess constitutional rights—the judiciary.  
The narrowly tailored ex ante judicial regime described above provides a 
much-needed system of independent review that allows the executive to carry 
out its vital mission of safeguarding our nation while still providing adequate 
procedural due process for U.S. citizens.  Although little can be done to 
remedy past transgressions, hope remains for the next Aulaqi—there is still 
time to mitigate the slippery slope toward executive despotism so feared by 
the Framers of our Constitution.  As Justice O’Connor masterfully 
articulated:  “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that 
our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in 
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles 
for which we fight abroad.”274  It would be of the highest shame if, cloaked 
under the banner of national security, we lost sight of the values that make 
our nation worth defending. 
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